Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
ABSTRACT
The F/A-18A-D fleet has been experiencing cracked brackets on the right main landing gear (MLG) wheel well hydraulic 2A (HYD 2A) pressure supply line. Investigations revealed that hydraulic pressure spikes in the HYD 2A supply line may be a contributing factor to the bracket failure. Some bracket failures have led to HYD 2A supply line failures. F/A-18E/F testing determined that landing gear circuit breaker resets and improper gear retractions following an emergency gear extension caused pressure spikes. A suspected but unproven cause of pressure spikes is the first engine start of the day. For this test, a production F/A-18A-D landing gear control unit (LGCU) was modified at NADEP North Island to accept a restrictor within the emergency port of the valve. The Boeing and Northrop Grumman developed restrictors were designed to control emergency spool movement and eliminate pressure spikes in the HYD 2A supply line. Three restrictors were designed with increasing levels of restriction (2000, 5500, and 9000 lohm). The elimination of pressure spikes is expected to reduce or eliminate the hydraulic line bracket failures that have been occurring in the USN/USMC fleet and FMS aircraft. (P/N 74A695907-1003) , and a triaxial accelerometer on the HYD 2A supply line. A special HYD 2A line was fabricated for the pressure tap to prevent modifying the production line. The modified HYD 2A line had a tee swaged into it off of which a line (4.75 in.) connected to the pressure transducer. The transducer was mounted to the test HYD 2A line near the LGCU using a clamp with a spacer. For the emergency line pressure transducer installation, the 90-deg elbow off of the MLGCU emergency port was replaced with a tee fitting from which a line (approximately 13 in. long) ran to the transducer. The transducer was mounted on a plate that was installed where the encoder/decoder normally is installed. Figure 1 shows the location of the instrumentation. The analog parameters were transmitted directly to an instrumentation van via cables. The analog parameters were monitored real-time on strip charts and recorded in instrumentation van. MUX BUS data were recorded on an onboard aircraft recorder. (2) MLGCU (production control unit, P/N 0711322-009, with restrictor, as modified, P/N 0711322-152-1) with 2000 lohm restrictor (P/N JETA1875200D) and production NLGCU. (2) 2000 lohm restrictor (P/N JETA1875200D) in both MLGCU and NLGCU (production P/N 0711322-011).
d. Piggyback Flight Tests
(1) Production MLGCU and NLGCU (P/N 0711322-011).
(2) 2000 lohm restrictor (P/N JETA1875200D) in both MLGCU and NLGCU (production P/N 0711322-011).
DESCRIPTION OF TEST METHODS
FIRST SIMULATED ENGINE START OF THE DAY 8. During a normal internal power (auxiliary power unit (APU)) engine start, hydraulic pressure reaches nominal levels before the control unit receives electrical power which allows the pressure spikes to occur as described in paragraph 1. In order to simulate an internal power engine start without having to start the engines, the following procedures were performed. The weight on wheels (WOW) box was connected and WOW selected. With the landing gear extended, the landing gear circuit breaker pulled. External electrical and hydraulic power were turned on and when hydraulic system pressure reached 3000 psi, the landing gear circuit breaker was pushed in to simulate electrical power coming on line at 60% N2.
HANDLE CONFIGURATION CHECK 9. Two configurations of landing gear handles exist on the F/A-18A-D aircraft to actuate the emergency gear extension. One configuration required that the handle be rotated and pulled while the other configuration only required the handle be rotated. In order to determine which configuration the test aircraft had, the following procedures were used: With external electrical and hydraulic power operating, the forward cockpit landing (LDG) gear handle was raised and the landing gear and doors were allowed to close. The LDG gear control handle was rotated 90 deg clockwise. If the gear did not extend, the LDG gear control handle was the type that must be pulled to activate the emergency gear extension. If the gear did extend, then the LDG gear control handle was the type that did not need to be pulled to activate the emergency gear extension. The test aircraft (SD105) had the handle that was rotated and pulled to active the emergency gear extension.
NORMAL GEAR EXTENSION/RETRACTIONS
10. Normal gear extensions/retractions were timed to ensure the restrictors did not adversely affect gear extensions and retractions. Normal gear extensions were timed by noting how long it took the gear to fully extend starting from when the LDG gear handle was lowered to when all three landing gear position lights in the handle were green. The limits, per reference 2, were as follows: NLG doors open and NLG extends in 8 sec maximum and MLG doors open and MLG extends in 7 sec maximum. Normal gear retractions were timed starting from when the LDG gear handle was raised and ending when the landing gear position lights extinguished. The limit, per reference 2, for gear retraction was 7 sec maximum.
EMERGENCY GEAR EXTENSION/RETRACTIONS
11. Emergency gear extension/retractions were performed to ensure system characteristics were satisfactory with the restrictors installed. The following procedures were used: with the landing gear circuit breaker open, the forward cockpit LDG gear handle was selected to down (landing gear warning light illuminated). Then, the forward cockpit LDG gear handle was rotated 90 deg clockwise and pulled to the detent. Time to full extension was recorded. The limit, per reference 2, for emergency gear extension was 30 sec maximum. Time started from when the LDG gear handle was pulled and ceased when all three landing gear position lights in the LDG gear handle were green. The APU/emergency brake accumulator was then recharged by holding the HYD ISO SW in "ORIDE" for 10 sec or until the "APU ACCUM" caution was removed (gage read between 2750 to 3250 psi and the needle stopped moving.) The emergency landing gear control was reset, followed by the landing gear circuit breaker. The LDG gear handle was not raised (landing gear retracted) until at least 5 sec after the circuit breaker and handle was reset.
SIMULATED FAILED MAIN LANDING GEAR CONTROL UNIT
12. To ensure that the emergency gear extension function was satisfactory when an MLGCU with a restrictor failed (blocked), the following procedures were performed: using the procedures defined in reference 3, a landing gear control test cable was used to simulate a failed MLGCU. External electrical and hydraulic power was disconnected. The landing gear circuit breaker was pulled and maintenance installed the landing gear control test cable assembly (3221as171-1) per reference 3. On the landing gear control test cable assembly, the gear up/norm switch was set to gear up. External electrical and hydraulic power was applied per reference 3. The emergency gear extension procedures were performed. After gear extension, the test cable was removed, following maintenance procedures in reference 3.
IMPROPER GEAR RETRACTION
13. To determine if the restrictor eliminated emergency spool movement and pressure spikes in the HYD 2A supply line, improper gear retractions were performed as follows: The landing gear circuit breaker was pulled. Then, with the forward cockpit LDG gear handle in the up position, the handle was rotated 90 deg clockwise and pulled to the detent to perform an emergency gear extension (normal procedures had the LDG gear handle in the down position for this step). When all three landing gear position lights in the LDG gear handle were green, the APU/emergency brake accumulator was recharged by holding the HYD ISO SW was in "ORIDE" for 10 sec or until the "APU ACCUM" caution was removed (gage read between 2750 and 3250 psi and the needle stopped moving). The emergency landing gear control function was reset by pushing in the forward cockpit LDG gear handle and rotating it 90 deg counterclockwise. The landing gear circuit breaker was then reset and the gear immediately retracted. Proper procedures require that the landing gear not be retracted until 5 sec after the circuit breaker is reset.
LESSONS LEARNED
14. Lessons learned were identified in the instrumentation area. The triaxial accelerometer came off the HYD 2A line twice during improper gear retractions. A change in glue to EA9394 AS9277009 Hysol Aerospace Products manufactured by Dexter Aerospace Materials Division, NSN: 8040011695304, was successful in keeping it attached. Additionally, the calibration of the accelerometer was too low initially at 500 g's and was recalibrated to 1,000 g's.
RESULTS AND EVALUATION GENERAL 15. Data for these tests consisted of pressures, accelerations, and gear extension/retraction times. Timing was performed by ground observers and by the crew in the cockpit both utilizing stop watches. The ground observer timed the extensions/retractions from the start of gear movement to when the gear had stopped moving. The cockpit timing was performed by starting when the gear handle was moved until the lights extinguished (extension) or lit up (retraction).
The two different methods resulted in significant timing difference for the same test points. Only the ground observer data are presented and were used to draw conclusions and recommendations for the ground testing since it was more consistent and had a larger sample size. However, the cockpit data trends were similar to the ground observer data. For the piggyback flight tests only, cockpit data were obtained. Note that the limits for gear extensions and retractions in paragraph 10 uses the cockpit observer for timing. Some of the ground observer data does not meet the limits; however, all of the cockpit acquired data were within limits for all test points. Subsequent paragraphs discuss the results, conclusions, and recommendations based upon each of the specific test purposes.
EMERGENCY SPOOL MOVEMENT AND PRESSURE SPIKE REDUCTION IMPROPER GEAR RETRACTION AFTER EMERGENCY EXTENSION
16. In order to baseline the system, improper gear retractions after emergency extensions were performed on the ground with a production MLGCU and NLGCU. During improper gear retractions after an emergency extension, the gear chattered loudly and violently. Pressures in the emergency line oscillated from about 50 to 1300 psig with peaks as high as 2200 psig. At the same time, pressures in the HYD 2A line oscillated from 0 to 8000 psig with peaks as high as 8900 psig. The chatter lasted approximately 1 sec. To an observer, it was an obvious, loud, and violent reaction during the gear retraction. Vibration levels in the y-direction exceeded the ±1,000 g calibration of the accelerometer. Values were estimated to be +500/-600 g's in the xdirection, over ±1,000 g's in the y-direction, and +700/-650 g's in the z-direction. Improper gear retractions after emergency extensions cause large pressure spikes that are a significant contributor to line movement and subsequent bracket failure.
RESTRICTORS EFFECTS ON PRESSURE SPIKE REDUCTIONS
17. Three restrictors were available to determine which eliminated or reduced emergency spool movement and pressure spikes in the HYD 2A line. After production baseline tests were completed with no restrictors, a 2000 lohm restrictor was installed in the emergency port of the MLGCU and the improper gear retraction procedures were repeated. In this configuration, the pressure spikes were essentially eliminated. No chatter or violent shaking of the gear was observed. In the emergency line, the pressure ranged from 50-150 psig. In the HYD 2A line, the pressure levels fluctuated between 2700-2900 psig with some stray peaks 200-600 psig greater than the quasi steady state levels. There were essentially no vibrations of the HYD 2A line during the gear retraction. Only a small peak (approximately 160 g's in all axes) occurred when the doors closed, which was the same with the production configuration. To determine if any additional benefits would be gained by a greater restriction, the 5500 lohm restrictor was installed. The only difference between the 5500 and 2000 lohm restrictor on the HYD 2A pressure levels was a reduction in the amount of pressure fluctuations. With the 5500 lohm restrictor installed in the MLGCU, the pressure levels were between 2800-2900 psig with no stray peaks. The emergency line pressure were the same with the 5500 and 2000 lohm restrictor, with levels at 50-150 psig. Vibrations were also eliminated with the 5500 lohm restrictor except for a small peak (approximately 160 g's in all axes) when the doors were closed. and 5500 lohm restrictors were tested in the MLGCU. Since both the 2000 and 5500 lohm restrictors were effective in removing the pressure spikes, gear extension and retraction times were compared to production times determine if any degradation was observed due to the increased flow restriction. Table 2 summarizes gear extension and retraction times for the three configurations. No significant increase in extension/retraction times occurs with either the 2000 or 5500 lohm restrictor as compared to the production configuration. (1) LGCU Configuration Gear Cycle Type (2) (1) LGCU Configuration Gear Cycle Type (2) MLGCU 
All times are from a ground observer and are averages that have been rounded to the nearest whole number. (4) The production configuration was the baseline and should only be used for comparison with tests on the same aircraft since extension and retraction times vary from aircraft to aircraft.
GROUND TESTS -PHASE THREE AND FLIGHT TESTS
21. For this phase, 2000 lohm restrictors were installed in both the NLGCU and MLGCU. A different aircraft, SD120 BuNo 163434, was used for these tests due to availability. Table 4 summarizes the ground test results with production (baseline) NLGCU and MLGCU and with 2000 lohm restrictors in both the MLGCU and NLGCU. Table 5 (1) LGCU Configuration Gear Cycle Type (2) MLGCU CIRCUIT BREAKER RESETS 22. Data were obtained during circuit breaker resets with both the gear handle up and down to determine if pressure changes occur. With the production configuration, MLGCU HYD 2A pressure spikes averaged 4000-4300 psig with a peak of 5600 psig. Similar pressures were recorded with 2000 lohm restrictor with average pressures of 4200 to 4300 psig. The 5500 lohm restrictor appeared to have a small reduction in pressure with average pressures of 4000-4200 psig. The reduction of pressure with the 5500 lohm restrictor was not significant compared to the almost complete elimination of pressure oscillations during the improper gear retraction (oscillations of 0-8000 psig to 100-200 psig). A decrease of 100 psig during the circuit breaker reset was more likely statistical variation rather than an effect of the restrictor. Vibrations of the HYD 2A line during the circuit breaker resets were similar to when the doors close, approximately 160 g's in all directions. The duration of the pressure spike during the circuit breaker reset is much shorter (approximately 0.1 sec) than during the improper gear retraction (1 sec). Since the duration and magnitude of the pressure spikes observed during the circuit breaker reset is significantly less than those of the improper gear retraction, the circuit breaker reset is not likely a significant contributor to the HYD 2A supply line failures. The 2000 and 5500 lohm restrictors, installed in the MLGCU, eliminated the short duration HYD 2A supply line pressure spike during a circuit breaker reset but did not reduce overall pressure levels significantly.
FIRST SIMULATED ENGINE START OF THE DAY
23. Pressure data were analyzed during test points that simulated first engine starts of the day. Neither pressure spikes nor vibrations were evident these test points. First engine starts of the day do not produce pressure or vibrations of the HYD 2A supply line that contribute to the line failures. 
